From regime change to revolutionary rule: The dangerous reengineering of Bangladesh

Dhaka: Political collapse rarely announces itself with clarity. More often, it unfolds behind comforting language – reform, transition, popular will. Bangladesh today is entering such a phase, one where constitutional governance is being steadily replaced by revolutionary justification, and where the long-term consequences may extend far beyond its borders.

The removal of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 did not occur in a vacuum. It followed years of sustained political pressure, growing international isolation, and internal complacency. While Hasina’s government was far from flawless, it was constitutionally elected and broadly aligned with Western strategic interests. Its downfall has produced not democratic renewal, but uncertainty – and a vacuum increasingly filled by unelected authority.

Muhammad Yunus assumed leadership not through elections but amid upheaval. Since then, Bangladesh has been governed under what is effectively an interim arrangement, one that now seeks permanence through a proposed national referendum scheduled for February 12. Publicly framed as an exercise in popular sovereignty, the referendum is increasingly viewed by critics as a mechanism to bypass elections and concentrate power beyond constitutional limits.

History offers no shortage of warnings about such moments. Leaders who claim revolutionary legitimacy often argue that extraordinary circumstances require extraordinary authority. Institutions, they insist, can wait. Elections can be postponed. Stability comes first. The result, more often than not, is the erosion of accountability rather than its restoration.

Bangladesh has seen versions of this dynamic before. Popular movements that began with genuine grievances eventually hardened into new forms of control. What makes the current moment especially concerning is the open dismissal of constitutional norms in favour of revolutionary narratives – a path that has led other nations toward prolonged authoritarianism.

The international dimension cannot be ignored. Since August 2024, Bangladesh’s foreign policy orientation has shifted perceptibly. Engagement with China has accelerated, particularly in infrastructure and defence-related sectors. Beijing’s diplomatic posture has been unusually visible, including public expressions of support for the current political roadmap. Such involvement raises legitimate questions about external influence over Bangladesh’s internal political restructuring.

Pakistan’s interests also intersect here. As China’s closest regional partner, Islamabad has long sought greater strategic depth in South Asia. A politically weakened or ideologically transformed Bangladesh would represent not merely a diplomatic gain, but a recalibration of regional balance – one with implications for India and, by extension, Western security interests.

Meanwhile, Western engagement has appeared hesitant and fragmented. Diplomatic statements continue to emphasise inclusivity and dialogue, yet there has been little public scrutiny of the referendum itself – or of the broader shift away from electoral legitimacy. Silence, intentional or not, risks being interpreted as acquiescence.

The July 2024 unrest is now routinely described as a “people’s uprising”. That characterization may contain elements of truth. But street mobilization alone does not confer unlimited governing authority. Revolutions, by their nature, are unstable foundations for long-term governance. They elevate those who claim to speak for “the people” while marginalizing institutions designed to restrain power.

Iran’s post-1979 experience remains a cautionary example. Revolutionary necessity was used to justify the creation of a supreme authority beyond constitutional oversight. Decades later, the result is a rigid political system resistant to reform and deeply hostile to dissent.

Bangladesh is not Iran. Its history, culture, and politics are distinct. But the logic being employed today – revolutionary legitimacy over constitutional process – is uncomfortably familiar.

For ordinary Bangladeshis, these developments are not theoretical. Economic uncertainty persists. Political pluralism has narrowed. Questions about the future of elections remain unanswered. What was presented as a temporary transition increasingly resembles an open-ended experiment in centralised authority.

The strategic consequences extend well beyond Dhaka. Bangladesh occupies a critical position in the Bay of Bengal, bordering major sea lanes and neighbouring one of the world’s most volatile regions. A Bangladesh drifting toward extra-constitutional governance while deepening ties with China and Pakistan would alter regional dynamics in ways that merit serious attention in Washington and European capitals.

None of this is inevitable. Bangladesh still possesses a politically engaged population, experienced civil servants, and a history of resilience. But time matters. Transitional arrangements have a habit of becoming permanent when left unchallenged.

Western policymakers face a choice. They can continue to prioritise rhetorical stability while avoiding uncomfortable questions. Or they can insist – quietly but firmly – that legitimacy flows from elections, not referendums designed to entrench power.

Revolutionary politics promise renewal. Too often, they deliver only concentration of authority and the slow suffocation of dissent. Bangladesh now stands at a point where the language of transition may soon harden into a system from which reversal becomes difficult.

The lesson from history is clear: when constitutional order is postponed “temporarily”, it is rarely restored easily. Bangladesh’s future – and the stability of a critical region – may depend on whether that lesson is heeded in time.

(Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury is an award-winning journalist, writer, and Editor of the newspaper Blitz. He specializes in counterterrorism and regional geopolitics. Views expressed are personal)

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